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Keynes's vision, which one can trace back to his youth, has to do with the logic of 
choice, not under scarcity, but under uncertainty (Skidelsky, 1992:538) 
By ”very uncertain” I do not mean the same thing as ”very improbable”. (Keynes, 
1936:148).  
[T]he point of the aggregate demand function, where it is intersected by the 




The principle of effective demand is the most distinct macroeconomic novelty within The 
General Theory. It can only be understood as a consequence of decision making in a 
business environment characterized by fundamental uncertainty.  Entrepreneurs do not 
know, and cannot know, what the future will bring with certainty. On the other hand they 
have to make decisions on production, investment and employment which take time and 
range into this uncertain future. 
In this paper I will trace the impact of uncertainty on effective demand in four 
dimensions: expected aggregate demand, supply price of production (profitability), the 
role of bank credit and finance and rather briefly the availability of supply factors and the 
role of sustainability.  
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The analytical procedure takes departure from within Critical Realism, 
because the social ontology of the business environment is considered as characterized by 
uncertainty – that we simply cannot know the future. How can sustainable development 
and the impact of the macroeconomic growth process be analysed meaningfully given 
these methodological conditions? 
It has become a part of the critical realist and post-Keynesian interpretation 
of The General Theory (1936) to stress that the social ontology of the macroeconomic 
reality is only partly visible and indeterminate which is reflected in a path-dependent 
development through historical time. This constantly changing macroeconomic 
environment is at best understood through the lenses of an open system, where 
uncertainty is given a prominent role as an integrated analytical part. This has to be so, 
because, uncertainty is all over the place.  That is the epistemological challenge when a 
realistic macroeconomic theory like the ‘principle of effective demand’ is investigated.  
 
Introduction to „uncertainty‟. 
 
a.  At the macro level 
Keynes’s perception was that economies did not behave in the way economists said they did, that 
something vital had been left out of their accounts, and it was this missing element which explained 
their malfunctioning; Keynes accused economists of his day of abstracting from the existence of 
uncertainty (Skidelsky, 1992: 538-9). 
 
Keynes developed his understanding of uncertainty throughout his economic writings. A 
Treatise on Probability from 1921 was mainly about individual decision making in an 
uncertain environment dependent on what information was available. Through the 1920’s 
Keynes got a vast number of practical experiences from his work in the financial sector, 
which was a great source of inspiration to develop his theory of ‘liquidity preference’ – how 
institutional organisation, individual uncertainty and different ‘degrees of confidence’ 
could explain parts of the working of the financial markets, of the transmission of 
monetary policy and of the development in the long term rate of interest. 
 But it was not until he had finished the writing of A Treatise on Money (1930) 
that he fully realised that the role of uncertainty had much wider implications.  During the 
early 1930’s he started to doubt that a realistic macroeconomic analysis could be kept 
within the boundaries of a closed model analyses. Because, if uncertainty plays a 
significant role at all stages of decision making, then coordination failures are unavoidable 
in this ever changing macroeconomic environment. Stability (not to speak of general 
equilibrium) would be like a mirage. In stead, the macroeconomic system will find itself 
moving along a continuous path-dependent route, where a terminal point is at best 
unknowable, but more likely not existing.  
 It has become a part of the new post-Keynesian interpretation of The General 
Theory (1936) to stress that the social ontology of the macroeconomic landscape is only 
partly visible and guided by causal mechanisms which make a path-dependent track record 
through historical time (Jespersen, 2009a). This constantly changing macroeconomic 
development is at best understood through the lenses of an open system, where 
uncertainty is given a prominent role as an integrated analytical part. This has to be so, 
because, uncertainty is all over the place.  That is the epistemological challenge to realistic 
macroeconomic theory.   
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Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which 
are relevant to the contemporary world. It is compelled to be this, because, unlike the natural 
science, the material to which it is applied is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through 
time, (CWK, XIV, 1937: 296/97, my emphasis) 
Individual uncertainty with some macroeconomic implications  
Uncertainty is caused by lack of information. Therefore uncertainty might have different 
intensities or ‘stats of confidence’. You may feel(!) more or less uncertain, but except for 
rare cases all individual activities are characterized by (different degrees of) uncertainty, 
because one cannot know nor estimate the exact outcome. Hence, expectations are 
uncertain due to this inherent lack of information (and a constantly changing 
environment). 
Risk is defined as measurable uncertainty. If an identical activity is 
undertaken by a large number of people who act independently of each other, e.g. natural 
death, then an exact outcome might be calculated with regard to the macro-outcome of the 
entire population. In these cases a private insurance company or some other institution, 
which reduces the individual uncertainty with regard to specific outcomes, might be 
established at a profitable basis. In the society in which we live, one can take out an 
insurance against the narrow economic consequences of e.g. theft, fire accidences and 
death. Buying an insurance imply that individual uncertainty, with regard to the money 
aspects of such incidents, is removed. But, as we know, most activities have also 
unforeseeable consequences. Therefore, even a well designed insurance contract can only 
reduce the degree of uncertainty, because it goes against the idea of a private insurance 
company to accept commitments which imply incalculable risk, i.e. uncertainty. 
One important conclusion is that privately organized business can never change 
individual uncertainty into socially calculable risk. The real value of financial savings will 
always be uncertain, because no one can predict the future inflation, which is characterised 
by macroeconomic uncertainty. Even the average living age of human beings is statistically 
unpredictable, which a number of pension funds regretfully have realized.  
If the consequences of individual uncertainty are not understood there is an acute 
risk of committing the fallacy of composition, Jespersen 2009a: chapter 7.  
 
At the individual level there are three obvious appearances: Individuals act 
 
1. without having full information about their immediate environment 
2. without much knowledge of the macroeconomic context and other decisive 
parameters for decisions (e.g. economic policies) 
3. without have full knowledge about the consequences of our actions 
 
 
Figure 1: The anatomy of individual uncertainty 
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Source: Jespersen (2009): chapter 4 
 We are all, as individuals, acting without knowing the exact consequences, and we act 
without having full information about external factors, which have an impact on the outcome. We 
cannot know the future, because the macroeconomic reality is (partly) hidden. It cannot be 
experienced, before it is too late to act, (Jespersen, 2009a: chapter 2). Hence, it is misleading and 
pretentious to assume that agents have full knowledge about the future – so-called rational 
expectations. In fact, to assume rational expectations in macroeconomics is not in any real 
analytical sense rational – one my rather say that ‘it is to assume our difficulties away’, (Keynes, 
1936: 34). 
 What are the implications for realistic macroeconomic analysis that people act under 
uncertainty – which can take the form of a variety of different perceptions with regard to 
information of the past, of the present and of expectations about the future? They try to behave as 
rational as possible by following conventions, group behaviour and setting up institutions which are 
intended to reduce/share the unforeseeable and unpredictable consequences of lack of information 
and external events. Even though information and consequences are uncertain, decisions have to be 
undertaken continuously: production, consumption and investment cannot be postponed until 
uncertainty has been cleared. If we ask for certainty as a precondition for acting – then we cannot 
act, which, on the hand, in some way is an act by itself. Hence, anyone has to act one way or the 
other on the back-drop of uncertainty.  The really intrigue question is then, how to make a proper 
macroeconomic analysis, where uncertainty is given the epistemological role which it deserves. 
Keynes’s Principle of Effective Demand developed in The General Theory is an 
example of such an open system analysis, which incorporates uncertain expectations at the 
individual/ business level and transfers them into a coherent macroeconomic theory of output and 
employment as a whole. 
 
 
The Principle of Effective demand 
 
As I now think, the volume of employment is fixed by the entrepreneur under the motive of seeking 
to maximise his present and prospective profits; whilst the volume of employment which will 
maximise his profit depends on the aggregate demand function given by his expectations of the sum 
of the proceeds. (Keynes, 1936: 77) 
 
         Future 
 





       (un)knownable 
 
 
       (un)likely 
  (un)known 
 
 
  (un)likely 
Individual       
uncertainty 
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Effective demand is one of the distinctive analytical concepts that Keynes developed in 
The General Theory. Demand and demand management have thereby come to represent 
one of the distinct trademarks of Keynesian macroeconomic theory and policy. It is not 
without reason that the central position of this concept has left the impression that 
Keynes’s macroeconomic model predominantly consists of theories for determining 
demand, while the supply side is neglected. From here it is a short step within a 
superficial interpretation to conclude that Keynes (and post-Keynesians) have ended up in 
a theoretical dead end, where macroeconomic development is exclusively determined by 
demand factors.  
 
Fortunately, a rich post-Keynesian literature on ‘Effective demand’ has emerged 
during the last years overcoming the above mention misinterpretation and adding more 
arguments to the subtle analytical concept than in fact can be found in The General 
Theory, see for instance Hartwig, 2007 and Gnos, 2009.  
 
As mentioned, the intention of this paper is to give an example of how an important 
macroeconomic causal relationship can be modelled on the basis of both supply and 
demand factors with the inclusion of specific institutional conditions such as different 
forms of competition. The choice of the analytical method plays a determining role for the 
macroeconomic ‘behaviour’ that can be deduced on the basis of an aggregate model-
structure based on the assumption of rational microeconomic behaviour under condition 
of uncertainty within a relevant institutional context and supported by empirical 
observations. Obviously, this methodological procedure is contrary to methodological 
individualism, where representative agent within a given market structure optimize with 














Explanation of the figure:  Effective demand determines how much output and 
employment the business sector as a whole plan to undertake in the next ‘production 
period’. It consists of (at least) four analytical components: 
 
1. Expected (by the business sector) aggregate demand in money terms 
2. Expected (by the business sector) costs and likely profitability in money terms, 
dependent on the degree of competition 
3. Bank credit facilities and costs (rate of interest ect.) 
4. Availability of factors of production 
 
 
In any case, it is the behaviour of profit-seeking firms acting under the ontological 
condition of uncertainty that is at the centre of post-Keynesian concept of effective 
demand. It is entrepreneurs’ expectations with regard to demand and supply factor that 
determine the plans for output as a whole and by that the effective demand for labour.  
Therefore, it was somewhat unfortunate that Keynes called his new analytical 
concept ‘effective demand’, which may have contributed to mislead generations of open 
minded macroeconomists to concluding that it was exclusively realized demand for 
consumer and investment goods that drives the macroeconomic development.  Hereby a 
gateway for the IS/LM-model interpretation of effective demand was opened, where 
demand creates its own supply.  
On the contrary, it is the interaction between the sum of the individual firms’ sales 
expectations (aggregate demand) and their estimated production costs (aggregate supply) 
that together with a number of institutional conditions (bank credit, labour market 
Effective Demand 
Expected proceeds from aggregate 
demand 
Expected Aggregate profitability: 
competition 
Aggregate credit facilitates: the 
working of the banking system 
Expected availability of supply 
factors: labour, capital, technology 
environmental conditions 
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organization, global competition and technology) determine the business sector decisions 
on output as a whole and employment.1  
Thus, it is my intention with this paper to eradicate the often presented point of 
view that Keynes’s macroeconomic theory does not have microeconomic or supply side 
considerations. In fact, Keynes’s economics is a theory of rational choice under 
uncertainty, Skidelsky, 1983.  
Firms’ uncertain expectations determine ‘effective demand’ 
The supply side in the goods market is an aggregate presentation of firms’ cost functions 
considered as a whole. It shows a relation between what Keynes called ‘supply price’, i.e. 
the sales proceeds that, given the production function and cost structures, is needed to 
‘just make it worth the while of the entrepreneurs to give that employment’ (Keynes, 
1936: 24). This means that behind the supply curve there is a combination of variable 
costs plus an expected profit at different levels of employment. At each level firms try to 
maximise their profit, if they succeed there is no (further) incentive for firms to change 
production or employment. 
These assumptions entail that the aggregate supply function (what Keynes called 
the Z-curve) is upward sloping and represents the proceeds that has to be expected by the 
industry as a whole to make a certain employment ‘worth undertaken’, see the Z-curve in 
figure 3. In fact, this aggregate supply function looks like it was taken directly from a 
standard, neoclassical textbook, where decreasing marginal productivity of labour in the 
representative firm is assumed; the main difference is that Keynes is dealing with the 
aggregate sum of heterogeneous firms i.e. the industry as a whole.  
The other equally important part of effective demand is aggregate demand 
function, which is the value of the sales that firms as a whole expect at different levels of 
macro-activity measured by employment (as a whole).  
In order for firms to act on the best information available they have to form 
expectations about future sales which have to be both empirically based and forward 
looking at the same time: let D be the proceeds which entrepreneurs expect to receive 
from the employment of N men, the relationship between D and N being written D = 
f(N), which can be called the Aggregate Demand Function. (Keynes, 1936: 25, my 
emphasis).  
It is a definition of few words that opens the possibility for a number of hypotheses 
with regard to how the entrepreneurs’ total expectations of proceeds are formed. But to 
me it seems undeniable that Keynes is speaking about a macroeconomic relationship. 
How much money will be spent on consumption and investment at different levels of 
activity (measured by employment)?  
The concept of aggregate demand can perhaps be best understood with reference to 
the far newer statistical concept of a ‘business sentiment index’. The business sentiment 
index is based on a survey among a cross-section of firms of their expectations about sales 
in the nearer future. This published index helps to form expectations of sales proceed for 
the industry as a whole or even for the entire macro-economy. It is assumed that on this 
basis, the firms form a kind of consensus-expectation with regard to the most likely 
                                                             
1 Adding the institutional conditions is an extension compared to Keynes’s presentation in The General 
Theory.  
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development in sales (considered as a whole) in the nearer future.2 This in some way 
consensus-expectation (aggregate demand) is a useful point of departure for the 
individual firms when they form their specific expectation of future sales. This sales 
expectation3 will therefore especially centre on the future macroeconomic demand (and 
today we would also add international competition). 
Accordingly, Keynes’s macro-theory has a microeconomic foundation of firms 
trying to maximise profit, but differs from neoclassical theory by introducing uncertainty 
related to the future, which makes an explicit introduction of aggregate demand relevant 
i.e. the expected sales proceeds by business as a whole.   
One possible interpretation of the behaviour of the individual firms is that they do 
not consider the firm specific demand as infinite at a given market price, see Hartwig, 
2007. In the short run they have to behave under the constraint of a rather fixed market 
share and a fixed capital stock. In this case it is not rational for individual firms to plan 
production as though it operates on a horizontal demand curve and should not expect the 
market price to be solely given ‘from outside’, not to speak about being constant. This 
means that the neoclassical assumption of firms exclusively adjusting the production on 
the basis of a given price and cost structures leaving demand neglected can be discharged, 
when uncertainty prevails. In the short run firms know that the aggregate demand at the 
macro-level is limited and prices flexible, which has to be included in the individual firm’s 
production planning. This analytical semi-closure of firms operating under the constraint 
of a limited market share makes it relevant to assume firms as a whole to behaving like a 
monopolistic competitor who has to react on a change in aggregate demand. In addition, 
the aggregate macro-behaviour is not in dissonance with the assumption the individual 
firms try to maximize profit given the available, but uncertain knowledge about the future: 
costs, sales proceeds, market share and competitive conditions (domestic and foreign). 
In this case it has been explained, why post-Keynesian economics has dismissed 
the neoclassical abstraction that the macro-supply curve can be presented by the 
behavioural relationship of one representative micro-firm. In post-Keynesian theory firms 
are assumed to behave with respect to their uncertain knowledge about aggregate demand 
(demand as a whole), and that they can only achieve a (un)certain share of this aggregate 
demand. Hence, demand is not unlimited for the individual firm, i.e. the individual 
demand curve is not horizontal within Keynes’s principle of effective demand. 
Finally, it is important for Keynes to make clear that aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand are two clearly separated entities. Keynes’s main objection against 
‘classical’ theory is exactly, that it equates the macro-supply and macro-demand functions 
in such a way ‘that supply creates its own demand’. But the conclusion that demand 







                                                             
2 ‘nearer future’ means analytical a period that corresponds to the time of implementation decisions related 
to hiring and firing in the labour market. 
3 How the total sales would be distributed among the individual firms within the branch would be of lesser 
importance in a macroeconomic perspective. 
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Figure 3.  Aggregate supply and aggregate demand together determine effective demand 
for labour 
 
 The impact of competition 
The degree of competition on the output-market determines the size of profit that can be 
achieved by the entrepreneurs. Post-Keynesian literature therefore distinguishes between 
two distinct market forms: perfect competition and monopolistic competition. This 
distinction leads to different results with regard to the size of profit and to how much 
employment a certain level of aggregate demand can be expected to generate in the short 
run. One of Keynes’s main points was precisely to demonstrate that his theory was 
‘general’, that it was valid no matter what form of competition prevailed on the goods and 
labour markets4. In fact, effective demand is a relevant analytical concept even in cases 
where firms were not profit maximising. Probably, he chose to assume profit-maximising 
behaviour and perfect competition even on the demand side of the labour market out of 
analytical convenience rather than realism.  
As mentioned above Keynes did in 1936 undertake his macro-analysis under 
assumption of ‘perfect’ competition in the sense of real wage being determined by 
marginal productivity – goods prices are given from outside the individual firm while the 
                                                             
4 The post-Keynesian literature distinguishes between ‘fundamental-Keynesian’ and ‘Kaleckian’ (named after 
the Polish-born economist Michal Kalecki, 1899-1970) economics - an often rather subtle distinction, King 
(2002). With regard to pricing on the goods market two different principles are assumed: marginal cost 
pricing and mark-up pricing respectively, which can be attributed to two different competitive conditions. 
The distinction is not important, since Keynes can be interpreted as covering both market forms, which not 
least Keynes (1939) confirms. For Keynes it became increasingly important to understand reality which made 









Z – Aggregate supply 
L - labour 
AD – Aggregate demand 
Point of effective demand  
Employment 
Source: Jespersen, chapter 8 
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aggregate demand had to be shared between firms in the market for final goods. In that 
case effective demand is determined as the intersection point between aggregate supply 
and aggregate demand, which also determines the analytical ‘profit-equilibrium’ (CWK, 
VII: xxxiii). At the point of effective demand there will be no inherent tendency in the 
business sector to change production or employment, because firms are assumed to 
maximise profit, as illustrated in figure 3.  
Conversely, it can be illustrated that increased competition may in the short run 
make a lower level of profit acceptable and in the longer run reduce production costs, 
which push the supply curve downward. Hence, globalisation could cause employment to 
increase if the generally required profit level was reduced due to increased competition. 
Furthermore, globalisation might also lead to increased real wages, which could boost 
aggregate demand. 
The analytical separation of aggregate demand and aggregate supply improves the 
understanding of the forces behind a change in the principle of effective demand. 
Uncertain expectations introduce a wedge between expected demand and required profit. 
Increased competition means that although firms still profit maximize the profit margin 
of the business sector as a whole has been reduced. That might have an impact on the 
expectation proceeds, because a higher wage sum means more purchasing power per 
employed person.  
The principle of effective demand works equally well under assumption of 
monopolistic competition, because firms have in any case to act as though the production 
capacity and aggregate demand is limited in the short run for the industry as a whole, 
which at the end of the day is a much more realistic assumption. 
 
 
The importance of bank credit 
  
Keynes’s presentation of the ‘principle of effective demand’ came rather early in The 
General Theory, chapter 3 and 5. Both aggregate supply and aggregate demand was 
defined, as explained above, in money terms. Keynes spoke about the supply price of 
output (Z-curve) and the expected proceeds of sales (AD-curve); but Keynes did not at that 
early stage take into consideration the financial aspect of output taking time to be 
produced. Of course, he was fully aware that production takes time from the moment it is 
decided upon until it is sold in the shops. The passing of time causes uncertainty, because 
firms do not know with any kind of certainty what proceeds the output will generate. 
 But there is another important aspect of production and consumption not 
coinciding. Production has to be financed in a way that firms are able to pay the factors of 
production by means of payments. This requirement gives the private banks a unique role 
when effective demand has to be realized. Firms can only use bank credit as working 
capital, because bank credit is considered as means of payments.  Financial institutions 
which have the specific position that their liabilities possess the ability of being accepted as 
means of payments, we call banks. Bank deposits are used as money (in the sense of means 
of payments).  
 This is the important contribution by the monetary circuit theory: effective 
demand cannot be realized unless there is access to working capital in the forms of means 
of payments, Graziani (2002). What matters are financial assets considered as generally 
accepted means of payment. Of course, Keynes had that perspective in mind, when he in 
1933 changed the heading of his lectures held in Cambridge from ‘a pure theory of money’ 
into ‘a monetary theory of production’. Money and real sector activities cannot in any 
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meaningful analytical sense be separated. In some way Keynes had anticipated that 
conclusion, when he wrote A Treatise on Money (TM), published in 1930. Here he 
demonstrated that a well functioning banking system could provide whatever means of 
payment that was needed for serious business purposes. Therefore, money had not to be a 
constraining factor, because of the build in endogeneity within the working of the banking 
system as a whole. In fact, to stabilize the money creating process there are good 
arguments to separate ‘business banks’ from other financial institutions. In his TM Keynes 
argued, that industrial circulation (current deposits by business banks) should be 
separated from financial circulation (savings deposits and (perhaps) treasury bills). 
Industrial Circulation and only that should have the status of means of payments 
(together with central bank notes), see Jespersen (2009c). 
 On the other hand if the banking system is not well functioning, which was 
overwhelmingly demonstrated in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
investment bank, bank credit suddenly became a co-determining and constraining factor 
on effective demand. Effective demand shrunk due to a fall in working capital. The z-curve 
could not be financed by bank credit as usually! The business sector had to improve on its 
profit rate to become less dependent on the banking sector. This increased profit mark-up 
made the z-curve swing to the left in the diagram. Furthermore banks raised their rate of 
interest which made working capital more expensive and added to the amount of necessary 
proceeds. No wonder that the effective demand did fall immediately, when the business 
sector could not get the usually working capital. Hence, less people were employed and the 
usual multiplier effect entailed in the AD-curve started to work backward.   
 [How could a part of the industrial circulation suddenly disappear? Simply, 
because one of the largest US investment banks suddenly went bankrupt. It had debt close 
to $600 bill. and only own capital of $ 22 bill. (Wikipedia). Registered loss in 2008 was $ 7 
bill., but with more to come. Lehman Brothers was heavily dependent on short term 
borrowing in the interbank market, when it was denied access to that market and the Fed 
turned it down due to too little collateral, the game was over. The bank became illiquid 
over night, probably do to insolvency. Deposits in Lehman Brothers were no longer liquid, 
because at that time there was no general federal deposit guaranty. They were frozen until 
assets of Lehman Brothers were sold and the over all account settled which could take 








Availability of supply factor: labour, capital, technology and 
environmental conditions 
The sense in which I am using the term [uncertainty] is that in which the prospect 
of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest 
twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of 
private wealth owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is 
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no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We 
simply do not know (Keynes, 1937: 113). 
Increased real capital 
Keynes had little to say about the availability of supply factors: labour, capital, technology 
environmental conditions not to speak of macroeconomic growth, which is quite 
understandable taking the economic situation in the first half of 1930’s into consideration5.  
On the other hand Keynes was very conscious about the importance of long-term 
expectations for the undertaking of real investment; but as Keynes said in 1937 – what can 
we know with certainty about any important matter 30-40 years ahead? - ‘about these 
matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever’. 
Keynes was working within the framework of an open system, where the degree of 
uncertainty increases with the length of the planning horizon. 
 In the General Theory Keynes had analysed the main driving factors within a 
macroeconomic path which was not in general supply constrained; but he did not make an 
explicit analysis of the capacity increasing implications of real investment. Post-Keynesian 
economics were left alone with regard to growth theory. Harrod (1939) made an attempt to 
overcome the gap in The General Theory of real investment being demand augmenting 
without having a direct supply effect. Harrod could have made some arguments related to 
the Z-curve, how it might take as a consequence of enlarged capital or improved 
technology and by that making the principle of effective demand capturing some of the 
dynamics derived from increased productivity. However, Harrod kept his theory within an 
analytical framework of a closed system, where planned investments were assumed to be 
similar to realised saving. There was within this analytical model no room left for 
individual uncertainty, although the model demonstrated an inherent instability due to 
lack of substitution between factors of production and lack of stabilisation policies. 
 In real life real investment is partly undertaken due to convention (what to do 
with profits), and partly due to animal spirit (an entrepreneur acting more like an artist 
than a stereotype capitalist). But, when real investments have been decided and are on 
stream, future business activities will be influence by these investments, because the 
macroeconomic development is path-dependent. Yes, endogenous growth theory is 
relevant also when uncertainty prevails. Hence, business cycle and growth trend cannot be 
separated. Firms invest in boom periods due to increased profit and optimism, whereas 
disappointed expectations will often have a negative effect through reduced state of 
confidence. 
The long-term productivity and sustainable development 
As far as I know, Keynes never wondered about the relationship between growth and 
exploitation of natural resources. In the inter-war period the supply of coal was vast and oil 
becoming more plentiful. Although the smog in larger industrial areas was already in the 
1930s a daily nuisance, but the alternative of a life without coal would have been 
                                                             
5 One of the few exceptions is the beautifully written essay on the Economic Possibilities of our 
Grandchildren published in 1930 and included in CWK, IX, where Keynes just plaid with the idea that 
economic growth could go on forever fuelled by the ever increasing productivity. 
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unbearable. Of course, Keynes had noticed that the overall productivity had increased 
considerably even through the years of depression6.  
  Increased productivity was in no way a new phenomenon. Looking at 
the macroeconomic development throughout the past two centuries would also have 
demonstrated a constantly increasing real wage and real production. The market-
economic system had been able to display continuously increasing productivity per 
capita, often in combination with reduced working hours. The reasons for the increased 
labour productivity are manifold (increased capital stock, education, innovations and 
exhaustion of natural resources among other things), which has increased the 
supply side capacity. Increased productivity reduces unit labour costs, which – ceteris 
paribus – increases the effective demand for production, but does not necessarily increase 
the demand for manpower.  
The increased supply potential can be illustrated by a change of the Z-curve in 
figure 3. It moves as mentioned above to the right in the diagram when labour 
productivity and the capital stock are increased. If the increased supply potential arises 
from an increased factor productivity (decreased marginal costs), then the Z-curve will 
rather have a tendency to move downwards (swing to the right), which will also increase 
the effective demand for labour measured in units of efficiency. Hence, what we do not 
really know is, how labour and capital efficiencies evolve through time.     
Even under the assumption of an unchanged AD-curve, the effective demand for 
output will increase when the Z-curve is moved to the right. If productivity is increased, 
then the intersection point between the AD and Z-curves will move – ceteris paribus7. 
This is due to the fact that the intersection point between the production that the firms 
expect to sell (AD) and the costs of undertaken the production (the Z-curve) is moved, 
which causes an increase in effective demand for production. On the other hand, nothing 
unequivocal can be said about the employment effect, because the increased productivity 
drives a wedge between production and employment. Production can be increased, 
without it automatically leading to increased employment. It is a well-known empirical 
phenomenon and is called ‘jobless’ growth. In order to determine the employment effect, 
the connection between production and employment must be continuously corrected for 
the changed productivity.  
An increased effective demand for production is thus not in itself a guarantee for 
increased employment in a growth perspective with increased work productivity. This 
requires that effective demand increases faster than labour productivity. Increased 
employment is therefore dependent on the expected volume of sales running faster than 
the development in labour efficiency.  
What can be said about sustainable development? Unfortunately, very little. If the 
copper price in twenty years time is something of which we will say, that ‘we simply do not 
know’, then the physical living conditions in 100 years time is something that we really do 
not know.  Uncertainty prevails. On the other hand we could repeat Keynes’s thought 
experiment. How could we take stock of increased productivity inherently in the capitalist 
market system? Business as usual means that aggregate demand has to grow with the 
same speed – doubling the GDP ever 40 years (a little less than 2 percent annual growth). 
                                                             
6 Within the Economic Possibilities of our Grandchildren, mentioned above, he made a calculation of a 
trend-increase in productivity of 2 percent p.a. - which quadruples production capacity in 70 years (two 
generations). Then he asked the question, if we accept the living standard of today (1930), then we could 
reduce the daily/yearly working time considerably – and concentrate on Love, Beauty and Truth, which could 
also be considered as a kind of sustainable way of life! 
7 Here, the OSCP method is used, which is therefore just one step in a longer chain of reasoning. 
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An alternative is to stop aggregate demand from growing in the future. That would lead to 
falling rate of profit, stagnating real investment unless the aggregate demand is directed 
towards energy conservation and durable energy production without necessarily reducing 
the material living standard.  
In some way it is due time to stop any further expansion of private consumption in 
the rich countries, because increased physically consumption seems not to make people 
any happier, perhaps even to the contrary due to externalities, (Layard, 2005). On top of 
that we know with reasonable certainty that the size of the global population in the 
developing countries will continue to grow for the coming 30-40 years with another 3 bill. 
people. If we further assume a rising living standard for all people in the developing 
countries to a level which is equivalent to the average of the OECD-countries of today say 
$ 30.000/year, then global GDP has to grow quite substantially before it, by the end of 
this century, might stabilise at a much higher level.  
But, if the rich countries would use all their future productivity gains (excess 
capacity) to protect the global environment by energy conservation and pollution 
reduction – their might be a chance of a reduced uncertainty with regard to sustainability 
(at least with regard to the greenhouse effect) for the following century, which is the time 
period where our grandchildren are expected to live. What the living conditions will be in 
other perspectives: water supply, urban life and incurable deceases, ‘we simply do not 
know’; but living conditions will be rather differently distributed around the globe. Some 
continents will be relatively unexploited and ‘under-populated’ which might cause other 
tensions and attempts to migration. 
The macroeconomic system is not self-adjusting. If we include the consideration of 
the exhaustible frame of natural resources and unpolluted environment the economy as a 
whole will become even less self-adjusting, but presumably follow an unpredictable, but 
path-dependent track into a seemingly more and more uncertain future. This means that 
the decisions we undertake (or do not undertake) today will have irreversible implications 
for the future. That is one of the less uncertain prediction related to the prevalent 
unsustainable development which is taking place right now, especially as long as policy 
decisions are building upon the conventional general equilibrium assumption that nature 
is economically unlimited, then the attitude that business as usual can go on unchallenged 









                                                             
8 One may recall the fate of Titanic. Some of us are travelling on first class, other on second class and the 
crowd on low economy class. When then iceberg is hit, there will only be room in the rescue boats for a 
section of those travelling on first class, the other passengers are left behind on the sinking boat with 
decreasing chances of survival. The unfortunate thing is, that it is only people at first class, who have the 
economic power to change the course of Titanic; but they have the least incentives to do anything! 
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Conclusion 
I shall argue that the postulates of classical theory are only applicable to a special case 
only and not to the general case, the situation which it assumes being a limiting point of 
the possible positions of equilibrium. Moreover, the characteristics of the special case 
assumed by the classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which 
we actually live, with the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we 
attempt to apply it to the fact of experience, (Keynes, 1936: 3). 
The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide 
for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes. 
The bearing of the foregoing theory on the first of these is obvious (Keynes, 1936: 426). 
 
Keynes did present an analytical alternative to the prevailing neoclassical general macro-
equilibrium framework. In this paper I have argued, that the real difference was the 
incorporation of individual uncertainty into the macroeconomic analysis.  
The ‘principle of effective demand’ is one of the major examples 
demonstrating that taking uncertainty seriously means getting new theoretical insights. 
The importance of effective demand cannot be understood without explicit reference to 
uncertainty in entrepreneurs’ decision making process.  
Very little can be said about the longer run perspective other than it depends 
on decisions taken to day especially concerning institutions and supply structures. With 
regard to sustainable development we can hardly know anything, except that uncertainty is 
increasing the faster we change the actual situation by resource exploitation and increased 
pollution. Furthermore, it seems quite likely that poor people and poor countries will be hit 
the hardest through deteriorating living conditions. Whereas, those countries, which have 
the economic excess to undertake real environmental changes, have the least incentives to 
do so – they are in a stronger position to protect themselves against the negative impact of 
changed climate and increased migration. 
The private sector cannot on its own plan for a sustainable future, because 
effective demand is a principle based on short term profit maximising. Keynes, 1936: 
chapter 24 concluded convincingly that the principle of effective demand causes the 
market economy to behave in an unstable way even in the short run, and it is not even able 





Chick, V. (1983), Macroeconomics after Keynes: A Reconsideration of the General Theory, Oxford: Philip 
Allan and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chick, V. (2003), ‘On Open Systems’, Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, 24 (1), pp. 3-16. 
 
Dow, S. (2001), Post Keynesian Methodology, in Holt, R. P. F. & S. Pressman (eds). 
 
Dow, S. (2003), ‘Probability, uncertainty and convention: economists’ knowledge and the knowledge of 
economic actors’, in Runde, J. & S. Mizuhara (eds). 
 
Gnos, C. (2009),  Circuit Theory Supplementing Keynes’s Genuine Analysis of the Monetary Economy of 
Production, chapter 1 in in J.-F. Ponsot and S. Rossi (eds): 1-20 
 16 
 
Graziani, A. (2003), The Monetary Theory of Production, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Harcourt, G.C. & P. A. Riach (eds) (1997), A 'Second Edition' of the General Theory, two vols, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Harrod, R. (1939), ‘An Essay in Dynamic Theory’, Economic Journal 49 (March): 14–33. 
  
Hartley, J. (1997), The Representative Agent in Macroeconomics, London: Routledge.  
Hartwig, J. (2007), Keynes vs. the Post Keynesians on the Principle of Effective Demand, The European Journal of 
the History of Economic Thought, Volume 14, Issue 4 December 2007 , pages 725 - 739  
Holt, R. P. F. & S. Pressman (eds) (2001), A New Guide to Post Keynesian Economics, London: Routledge. 
 
Jespersen, J. (2004), Macroeconomic stability: Sustainable development and full employment in Reisch, 
L.A. & I. Røpke (eds), The Ecological Economics of Consumption. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 233-250 
 
Jespersen, J. (2009a), Macroeconomic Methodology – a Post-Keynesian Perspective, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar  
 
Jespersen, J. (2009b), ‘Bridging the gap between monetary circuit theory and post-Keynesian monetary 
theory’, in J.-F. Ponsot and S. Rossi (eds), The Political Economy of Monetary Circuits: Tradition and 
Change in Post-Keynesian Economics, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 21-35. 
 
Jespersen, J. (2010), Keynes’s lost distinction between industrial and financial circulation, European 
Journal of Economic and Social Systems,  (forthcoming) 
 
Keynes, J. M., The Collected Writings, vols. I-XXX, edited by Donald Moggridge and published by Macmillan 
& Cambridge University Press for The Royal Economic Society in the years 1972-1989. Literature sources are 
written as ‘CWK ‘followed by the volume number in roman. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1921), A Treatise on Probability, CWK, VIII.  
 
Keynes, J. M. (1931), Essays in Persuasion, CWK, IX. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, CWK, VII. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1973b), The General Theory and After: Part II, Defences and Development, CWK, XIV. 
 
King, J. (2002), A History of Post Keynesian Economics since 1936, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
King, J.  (ed.) (2003), The Elgar Companion to Post Keynesian Economics, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Lawson, T. (1997), Economics and Reality, London: Routledge. 
 
Ponsot, J.-F. and S. Rossi (eds) (2009), The Political Economy of Monetary Circuits: Tradition and Change 
in Post-Keynesian Economics, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Rochon, L.-P. and S. Rossi (eds) (2003), Modern Theories of Money: The Nature and Role of Money in 
Capitalist Economies, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar. 
 
Rossi, S. (2007), Money and Payments in Theory and Practice, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Setterfield, M. (2003b), ‘Effective Demand’, in King, J. (ed.). 
 
Skidelsky, R. (1983/1992), John Maynard Keynes: Hopes betrayed, 1883-1920 and The Economist as 
Saviour, 1920-37, London: Macmillan Press. 
